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Population Size and the Size of Government 
 
Tim Krieger* and Daniel Meierrieks† 
 
Abstract 
We examine the effect of population size on government size for a panel of 130 countries for the 
period between 1970 and 2014. We show that previous analyses of the nexus between population 
size and government size are incorrectly specified and fail to consider the influence of cross-
sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration. Using a panel time-series approach that 
adequately accounts for these issues, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect 
on government size. This finding suggests that effects of population size that increase 
government size (primarily due to the costs of heterogeneity, congestion, crime and conflict) 
dominate effects that reduce government size (primarily due to scale economies). 
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Government size – or, interchangeably, the government share, i.e., government spending as a 
fraction of total GDP – is an important macroeconomic variable. For instance, the size of 
government may affect factor accumulation and productivity (e.g., Dar and AmirKhalkhali, 
2002), macroeconomic volatility and economic growth (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997; 
Afonso and Furceri, 2010; Bergh and Henrekson, 2011; Carmignani et al., 2011; Jetter, 2014) 
and life satisfaction (Bjornskov et al., 2007). 
Given its role in determining many important socio-economic outcomes, a considerable 
theoretical and empirical literature has sought to identify the determinants of government size, 
investigating, inter alia, the role of a country’s level of economic development, the nature of its 
political institutions as well as of its degree of ethnic fragmentation, demographic conditions and 
history of war and conflict (e.g., O'Reilly and Powell, 2015; for a brief review, see Shelton, 
2007: 2234-2240). Among the potential determinants of government size, population size has 
gained some prominence in the literature. 
There exists conflicting hypotheses about the effect of population size on government size. For 
one, it is argued that more populous countries benefit from scale economies and reduced 
exposure to the risks of international conflict and trade and can thus afford smaller governments 
(e.g., Alesina, 2003: 303-304). For another, more populous countries may rather necessitate 
larger governments to counter congestion, heterogeneity costs and the ill effects of a larger 
population size on domestic conflict (e.g., Oakland, 1972; Alesina, 2003: 304-305). The 
empirical evidence reflects this theoretical ambiguity, with some studies reporting a negative 
population-government size relationship (e.g., Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) and others reporting 
positive or non-significant associations (e.g., Ram, 2009; Jetter and Parmeter, 2015). 
Our paper adds to the diverse empirical evidence on the population-government size nexus in 
two fundamental ways. First, we uncover methodological shortcomings associated with 
“traditional” approaches to the population-government size nexus. Specifically, traditional 
approaches rely on pooled OLS and fixed-effects models, thereby not accounting for cross-
sectional dependence, non-stationarity and (panel) cointegration. Corresponding 
misspecifications result in invalid inferences about the population-government size relationship. 
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Second, we address these methodological shortcomings by employing a novel empirical panel 
time-series approach (the common correlated effects mean-group error-correction model) that 
accommodates cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and (panel) cointegration. To 
preview our main finding, the estimates from this approach indicate that larger population size is 
positively related to government size, suggesting that the costs of size (due to congestion, crime, 
conflict etc.) dominate its potential benefits (e.g., from scale economies). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the theory 
and evidence related to the population-government size nexus. In Section 3, we introduce the 
data and test the variables measuring population and government size for cross-sectional 
dependence, non-stationarity and (panel) cointegration, showing that all of these issues matter. 
Section 4 investigates the effect of population on government size using the “traditional” pooled 
OLS and fixed-effects approaches. Sources of misspecification when employing this approach 
are identified and discussed. Section 5 introduces the common correlated effects mean-group 
error-correction model. We show how this model eliminates various sources of misspecification. 
Using this model, we provide a number of novel insights into the government size-population 
size nexus. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Discussion 
2.1 From Larger Populations to Smaller Governments 
Several advantages may allow more populous countries to afford smaller governments. First, 
more populous countries can capitalize on scale economies associated with the provision of 
public goods (Alesina, 2003). Fixed costs of public goods and increasing returns to scale may 
make it possible for more populous countries to allocate fewer resources to public spending (in 
relation to total GDP). For instance, Andrews and Boyne (2009) show that administrative costs 
are lower in larger local governments for a sample of English communities, a finding consistent 
with the notion of economies of scale. 
Second, more populous countries are less likely to be threatened by foreign aggression, given 
that their sheer size discourages war (Alesina, 2003). This in turn allows larger countries to 
spend comparatively less on defense and security, again negatively affecting government size. 
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Third, more populous countries benefit from comparatively larger domestic markets, creating 
fewer incentives to engage in international trade and competition. Thus, more populous countries 
are less exposed to the volatility and external risk associated with openness (Alesina and 
Wacziarg, 1998). By contrast, more open (i.e., smaller) economies face more risk. They may 
consequently use government spending to mitigate associated risks, thus increasing the size of 
government (Rodrik, 1998). 
2.2 From Larger Populations to Larger Governments 
Theory suggest that population size may not only have effects that reduce government size. 
Rather, certain factors may make more populous countries more likely to expand the size of their 
government. 
First, the benefits of size (primarily, scale economies) may decrease when public goods provided 
via government spending are subject to congestion (e.g., Oakland, 1972). For instance, 
congestion is expected to incur administrative costs when it leads to the rationing of public goods 
(Oakland, 1972). Consequently, the costs of managing congestion may offset or even outweigh 
the advantages of size due to scale economies. 
Second, Alesina (2003) argues that more populous countries face higher costs of heterogeneity of 
preferences. For instance, more populous countries exhibit more interest groups and political 
parties, reflecting the country’s (comparatively) high level of heterogeneity (e.g., Murrell, 1984). 
In turn, a larger number of interest groups and political parties is expected to increase 
government size, e.g., as (diverse) interest groups and parties will have to accommodate many 
pet projects to form a winning coalition (e.g., Mueller and Murrell, 1986; Mukherjee, 2003). 
Third, population size may contribute to costly social deviance and conflict. For instance, more 
populous communities tend to experience disproportionately more crime due to reduced social 
control and solidarity (Chamlin and Cochran, 2004). Reduced social control due to increasing 
population size may also contribute to other forms of deviance (e.g., corruption), which are 
expected to require an expansion of the government (more police, establishment of anti-
corruption agencies etc.) as a countermeasure, leading to a positive association between 
population and government size. Finally, population size is a strong positive predictor of 
domestic conflict such as civil war (for a review, see Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and terrorism 
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(for a review, see Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). For instance, increases in population size may 
result in more conflict by exacerbating resource scarcity, distributional conflicts or 
environmental degradation (e.g., Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Brückner, 2010). In turn, increased 
risk of violent conflict can be expected to increase government size, as grievances may have to 
be met with higher public spending on social policies (education, health, social security etc.) 
(e.g., Taydas and Peksen, 2012) or with more public spending on security, the police and the 
military in order to suppress conflict. 
2.3 Empirical Evidence 
Empirical studies find mixed evidence on the population-government size nexus. In their seminal 
analysis, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) find that population size is indeed negatively associated 
with government size. A similar result is obtained by Benarroch and Pandey (2008). Shelton 
(2007) also finds that government spending tends to decrease with population size. 
However, other empirical studies prove less conclusive and fail to show that more populous 
countries have smaller governments. Rodrik (1998) reports no statistically significant association 
between population size and government size. Similarly, Jetter and Parmeter (2015) and 
Kimakova (2009) find that the effect of population size on government size is dependent on 
empirical choices (e.g., considering the use of specific datasets). Similarly, Ram (2009) finds that 
while population size is negatively related to government size in a pooled OLS setting (thus 
mimicking the approach of Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998), the relationship between both variables 
actually becomes positive in a fixed-effects setting. Finally, when studying the relationship 
between macroeconomic risk and government size, Carmignani et al. (2011: 786) report that 
population size positively correlates with government size. 
 
3. Data 
Motivated by the diverse theoretical considerations and empirical findings on the population-
government size nexus, we aim at re-examining this nexus using a novel empirical approach. For 
following empirical analyses, we use balanced panel data for 130 countries for the 1970-2014 
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period.1 The summary statistics are reported in Table 1. A country list is provided in the 
appendix. 
—Table 1 here— 
3.1 Measuring Population and Government Size 
Our choice of variables measuring population and government size reflects earlier empirical 
studies on the nexus between population and government size (e.g., Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; 
Ram, 2009; Jetter and Parmeter, 2015). First, government size is measured as government 
consumption as a share of output-side real GDP at current purchasing power parities (meaning 
that prices are constant across countries but depend on the current year). Second, population size 
is measured by a country’s population size in millions of inhabitants. Both data series are drawn 
from the Penn World Table (version 9.0) (Feenstra et al., 2015). 
3.2 Cross-Sectional Dependence, Panel Unit Roots and Panel Cointegration 
As emphasized in the introduction, we suspect that both data series are affected by cross-
sectional dependence and non-stationarity, with the latter issue raising the possible issue of 
(panel) cointegration. Disregarding these issues may contribute to misspecifications and 
incorrect inferences regarding the population-government size nexus. 
Cross-Sectional Dependence. Cross-sectional dependence refers to the interdependency of 
variables of interest between countries, where this interdependency may be due to, e.g., common 
shocks (e.g., economic booms or recessions) or spillover effects (Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012). 
If not accounted for, cross-sectional dependence in panel data may lead to correlation in the 
                                                          
1 We arrive at this sample size because (i) a balanced panel is crucial for many statistical tests we 
run below and (ii) the country-specific data series have to be long enough to allow for individual-
country regression analysis. Therefore, we drop from our sample countries with gaps in the data 
and with too short data series (which mainly applies to countries that gained independence after 
1990). We have no reason to believe that our sample suffers from sample selection bias. For 
instance, our sample covers both very small (e.g., St. Vincent and the Grenadines) and very large 
countries (e.g., China). 
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residuals, consequently affecting estimation efficiency and the validity of inference (Sarafidis 
and Wansbeek, 2012). 
For our case, it is plausible that cross-sectional dependence indeed exists. For instance, 
population size may be correlated across countries due to common exposure to adverse economic 
shocks that lead to similar effects on out-migration intentions (which are expected to increase in 
times of economic downturns) and fertility decisions (which are expected to decrease in times of 
economic crises) in neighboring countries. Similarly, government size may exhibit cross-
sectional dependence. For instance, Cavatorta and Smith (2017) show that strategic interactions 
between countries (e.g., arms races or alliances) induce cross-sectional dependence in military 
spending, which may ultimately be one source of cross-sectional dependence in overall 
government size. 
Non-Stationarity. Variables that trend over time are often found to be non-stationary (i.e., 
containing a unit root). If a regression model includes two (or more) non-stationary variables, 
this may give rise to the spurious regression problem, as shown in a pioneering study by Granger 
and Newbold (1974). This proves problematic because significance tests on the regression 
coefficients from spurious regressions are invalid (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Kao, 1999). 
That is, when regression models include non-stationary variables, it is possible that significance 
tests indicate a “significant” relationship between variables when in fact none exists. 
Importantly, the problem of spurious regression also extends to the panel setting (e.g., Kao, 
1999). 
For our data, it is plausible that both population size and government size are non-stationary. For 
instance, global population size has obviously exhibited a long-run positive trend (inducing non-
stationarity) over the last several decades (the so-called “population explosion”), which is 
primarily due to mortality decline resulting from medicinal-technological advances (e.g., Lee, 
2003). Similarly, trends towards larger governments are widely discussed in the literature, e.g., 
by Peltzman (1980), Holcombe (2005) and Durevall and Henrekson (2011). For instance, ratchet 
effects (where government size grows during times of crises but does not revert back to pre-crisis 
levels once the crisis is over) may explain a positive trend in government size (Holcombe, 2005). 
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For example, O’Reilly and Powell (2015) show that the advent of war (as a crisis) induces 
government growth which persists after the war is over. 
Panel Cointegration. When two variables are non-stationary and integrated of the same order, 
they may be cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). Cointegration refers to the existence of a 
stationary linear combination of two non-stationary variables. Disregarding (panel) cointegration 
is expected to result in misspecification, leading to incorrect inferences (e.g., Granger, 1986; 
Engle and Yoo, 1987; MacDonald and Kearney, 1987). By contrast, accounting for cointegration 
avoids misspecification issues and allows for inferences about the long-run relationship between 
non-stationary variables, while also considering any short-run dynamics (Engle and Granger, 
1987). 
For our case, it seems plausible that population and government size are cointegrated, sharing a 
stable long-run (cointegrating) relationship. Referring to our discussion of the literature in the 
previous section, this relationship may either be positive or negative. For one, increases in 
population size may induce a reduction in government size due to scale economies and reduced 
exposure to international trade and competition. For another, increases in population size may 
result in a long-run increase in government size due to higher congestion and heterogeneity 
costs. 
Tests for Cross-Sectional Dependence, Panel Unit Roots and Panel Cointegration. To examine 
whether our variables of interest are indeed subject to cross-sectional dependence and non-
stationarity, we run a series of statistical tests. 
First, we test for cross-sectional dependence by employing Pesaran’s (2004) CD-test, which tests 
the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence against the alternative of cross-sectional 
dependence. Importantly, the CD-test is robust to non-stationarity (Pesaran, 2004), which may 
also matter to the variables we examine. Second, to investigate the data series’ stationarity 
properties, we employ two different panel unit root tests, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (IPS test) (Im 
et al., 2003) and the CADF test developed by Pesaran (2007). For both tests, the null hypothesis 
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is that the investigated series contain unit roots (i.e., are non-stationary) versus the alternative 
that (a fraction of) the series are stationary. Both tests account for cross-sectional dependence.2 
As shown in Table 2 (Panel A), both data series are indeed affected by cross-sectional 
dependence, meaning that observations for both government and population size are not 
independent across countries. Such interdependencies may be explained by exposure to, e.g., 
common shocks. For example, economic crises that transcend national boundaries and politico-
economic cooperation, competition or hostilities between nation-states may play a role in this 
context, leading to effects on migration (and thus population size) and government spending 
(e.g., on the military) that are correlated across countries. 
The results of the panel unit root tests (Panel B) indicate that both data series are non-stationary 
in levels but stationary after first-differences are taken. These findings prove highly intuitive. 
First, the global population doubled between 1970 and 2014, from 3,682 to 7,349 million. This 
development may be due to medical advances, advances in hygiene and other socio-economic 
factors that have allowed many developing countries to enter a stage of demographic transition 
with (relatively) low death but high birth rates (Lee, 2003). Second, mechanisms such as ratchet 
effects may explain trends towards larger governments (e.g., Peltzman, 1980; Holcombe, 2005; 
Durevall and Henrekson, 2011). 
—Table 2 here— 
Given that both series are found to be non-stationary and integrated of the same order (i.e., I(1)), 
the series may also be cointegrated, sharing a long-run equilibrium relationship. To assess 
whether this is the case, we employ the test for panel cointegration developed by Westerlund 
(2005). Here, we test the null hypothesis that the investigated series are cointegrated against the 
alternative that they are not. When employing the test, we subtract the cross-sectional averages 
from the series to mitigate the influence of cross-sectional dependence, which is warranted given 
the results reported above. As shown in Table 2 (Panel C), the different variants of the panel 
                                                          
2 The IPS test does so by demeaning the data. For the CADF test, cross-sectional averages of 
lagged levels and first-differences of the investigated series are added to the standard augmented 
Dickey-Fuller regressions that are used to investigate non-stationarity. 
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cointegration test unanimously suggest that population and government size are indeed 
cointegrated.3 
 
4. Pooled OLS and Fixed-Effects Regressions 
4.1 Empirical Approach 
Having introduced and pre-tested the data, we begin our empirical analysis of the population-
government size nexus by running a series of regressions using pooled OLS and fixed-effects 
approaches, following previous empirical efforts that have also studied the effect of population 
on government size in such frameworks (e.g., Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Ram, 2009; Jetter 
and Parmeter, 2015). As in these studies, we consider a series of empirical specifications of the 
following form: 
GOV𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1POP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋
′ + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (1) 
Here, we relate population size (POP) to government size (GOV) for country i at year t. Both 
data series are log-transformed to remain comparable to previous empirical studies, while also 
being less affected by outliers.4 Equation (1) also includes an intercept (α0) and an idiosyncratic 
error term (ε). Furthermore, we include country fixed-effects (θ) when employing the fixed-
effects estimator to account for (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, a 
country’s geographical size may govern whether increases in population size may rather induce 
scale economies or congestion costs, where the former effect is expected to dominate in 
countries with larger geographical size (and thus lower population density). Finally, a simple 
way to account for one potential source of cross-sectional dependence, common shocks, is to 
amend an empirical model by a set of year dummies (φ), as we do for some variants of (1). 
However, such an approach may not be sufficient to entirely expunge the cross-sectional 
dependence. 
                                                          
3 Employing alternative panel cointegration tests by Pedroni (1999, 2001) yields the same 
finding (see Supplementary Table 1). 
4 Also, first-differences of log-transformed data series approximate their growth rates, facilitating 
the interpretation of results when first-differences are taken. 
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With respect to equation (1), inferences about the population-government size nexus are only 
valid when cross-sectional dependence and non-stationarity (and thus panel cointegration) are 
not influential. However, the pre-tests reported in Table 2 suggest that these assumptions may 
not be justified. Consequently, if cross-sectional dependence and non-stationarity are indeed 
influential in (1) but not accounted for, they will be “captured” in the regression residuals (i.e., 
the εt series). Consequently, below we subject the regression residuals to a number of diagnostic 
tests to examine whether misspecification issues are indeed present. In the presence of 
misspecification issues, the results from (1) will be misleading and potentially lead to incorrect 
inferences about the population-government size nexus. 
4.2 Empirical Results 
Our regression results are reported in Table 3. Employing a baseline specification similar to 
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), Ram (2009) and Jetter and Parmeter (2015), we find that 
population size exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on government size. As in 
Ram (2009) and Jetter and Parmeter (2015), the estimated effects are much larger in the fixed-
effects setting. These results are consistent with the arguments put forth by Alesina and 
Wacziarg (1998) and Alesina (2003) regarding the benefits of population size in reducing size of 
government, e.g., in the form of scale economies and reduced relative exposure to international 
markets. 
—Table 3 here— 
However, the diagnostics concerning cross-sectional independence and stationary residuals 
reported in Table 3 are clearly worrisome. First, tests of the regression residuals for unit root 
presence strongly indicate that the residuals are non-stationary. Non-stationary residuals may 
imply a spurious regression (e.g., Kao, 1999). They also suggest that a cointegrating relationship 
between population and government size ought to be modelled. Second, the majority of CD-test 
results indicate that the residuals are affected by cross-sectional dependence.5 This may affect the 
                                                          
5 The inclusion of year dummies can ameliorate the issue of cross-sectional dependence in the 
pooled OLS setting. However, their inclusion is not sufficient to account for cross-sectional 
dependence when fixed-effects models – which are preferred as they better reflect the panel 
structure of the data – are run. This suggests that the underlying cross-sectional dependence is 
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validity of inference (Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012). In sum, the diagnostics reported in Table 3 
indicate that the empirical results from a “traditional” approach to the population-government 
size nexus shown in Table 3 are likely misleading. 
Table 3 also reports some “naïve” ways to remedy the misspecification issues. First, taking first-
differences of both variables is expected to produce stationary variables and thus stationary 
residuals. Second, employing standard errors developed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) ought to 
aid statistical inference, as these standard errors are not only robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, but also to general forms of cross-sectional dependence. Employing these 
remedies in models (5) and (6) of Table 3, we find that population size no longer exerts a 
statistically significant effect on government size, suggesting that the relationship between the 
two variables may indeed be spurious. However, the models in first-differences – though free of 
non-stationary residuals – discard valuable information about the long-run (cointegrating) 
relationship between population and government size. Incorrectly disregarding (panel) 
cointegration may be another source of misspecification and may therefore also lead to incorrect 
inferences (e.g., Granger, 1986, Engle and Yoo, 1987; MacDonald and Kearney, 1987). 
 
5. Panel Time-Series Approach 
5.1. Empirical Approach 
Given the misspecification issues plaguing the “traditional” pooled OLS and fixed-effects 
regression frameworks, in this section we employ a modelling approach that is able to account 
for cross-sectional dependence, while producing stationary residuals and incorporating a long-
run (cointegrating) relationship between population and government size. In detail, we use the 
panel time-series approach of Pesaran (2006) and Chudik and Pesaran (2015), the (dynamic) 
common correlated effects (mean-group) error-correction model.6 Below, we introduce this 
model in several steps, showing how these steps relate to misspecification issues that affect the 
“traditional” pooled OLS and fixed-effects regression frameworks. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
too complex to be modelled by only considering year-fixed effects (cf. Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 
2012). 
6 A highly instructive introduction to and application of this empirical method is provided by 
Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015). 
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As a first step, we account for non-stationarity and cointegration by considering the following 
error-correction model (ECM): 
∆GOV𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝜌(GOV𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛾
𝑝Δ𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
𝑔Δ𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (2) 
Here, government size and population size are first-differenced (indicated by the first-difference 
operator ∆) to achieve stationarity. Besides a set of fixed effects (α0i) and well-behaved error 
term (εit), equation (2) also includes the error-correction term ρ(GOVi,t-1-βPOPi,t-1) which 
corresponds to the stationary linear combination of the levels of government and population size, 
allowing us to examine the long-run relationship between these variables (Engle and Granger, 
1987). 
We can reparametrize equation (2) to: 
∆GOV𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0𝑖 + 𝜋
𝐸𝐶𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋
𝑃 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋
𝑝 Δ𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋
𝑔Δ𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (3) 
Here, if the regression coefficient πEC is statistically significant and lies between [0; -1] 
(implying dynamic stability), a long-run (cointegrating) equilibrium exists, where the exact value 
of πEC indicates the speed of adjustment to it. πP indicates the long-run effect of population size 
(in levels) on government size (De Boef and Keele, 2008). An alternative way to measure this 
long-run effect is to recover β from equation (2) by β= -πP/ πEC. Finally, πp and πg allow us to 
directly gauge the short-run effects of lags of the first-differences of population and government 
size on present values of government size (in first-differences) (De Boef and Keele, 2008). 
As a final step, we add the cross-sectional averages of all variables in the model. Thus, we arrive 
at: 
∆GOV𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0𝑖 + 𝜋𝑖
𝐸𝐶𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑖
𝑝Δ𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡  + 𝜋𝑖
𝑔
Δ𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     
                           +𝜋1𝑖
𝐶𝐴ΔGOV𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋2𝑖
𝐶𝐴GOV𝑡−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜋3𝑖
𝐶𝐴ΔPOP𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋4𝑖
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                       
+ ∑ 𝜋5𝑖𝑙




𝐶𝐴ΔPOP𝑡−𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑝
𝑙=1
                                           (4)  
Regarding (4), a number of remarks are necessary: 
(i) Combining the first and second lines of equation (4) gives Pesaran’s (2006) common 
correlated effects estimator. The terms in the second line are the cross-sectional averages. As 
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argued by Pesaran (2006), the inclusion of these averages can accommodate cross-sectional 
dependence. Their inclusion provides consistent estimates of the parameters in the first line of 
equation (4) in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, i.e., unobserved common factors (due 
to spillover effects, global politico-economic shocks etc.) (Pesaran, 2006).7 
(ii) Equation (4) includes one lag of the dependent variable; below, we shall also add further lags 
of the dependent variable (as well as of the explanatory variable) to the model. This dynamic 
specification is expected to affect the consistency of the common correlated effects mean-group 
estimates due to endogeneity (Chudik and Pesaran, 2015). Chudik and Pesaran (2015) argue that 
by adding further lags of the cross-sectional averages, the common correlated effects mean-
group estimators perform well again, even when allowing for weakly exogenous regressors in a 
dynamic setting. These additional lags of the cross-sectional averages are indicated by the third 
line of equation (4). 
(iii) As in the fixed-effects model, we control for unobserved heterogeneity through a country-
varying intercept. However, heterogeneity is not necessarily only time-invariant and independent 
of the explanatory variables (which would be accounted for by an intercept that varies by 
country). For instance, it is plausible that systematic and time-varying differences exist between 
countries in preferences over welfare spending and redistribution (both of which are expected to 
increase government size) (e.g., Corneo and Grüner, 2002). Such differences could result in 
heterogeneous responses in government size with respect to changes in population size. Indeed, 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the incorrect assumption of parameter homogeneity 
produces inconsistent and potentially misleading estimates of the regression coefficients. 
Consequently, to account for more complex forms of heterogeneity, we apply the mean-group 
approach of Pesaran and Smith (1995).8 That is, we allow all parameters to vary by country; in 
contrast, they were set equal across countries in equations (2) and (3). To arrive at the mean-
group estimates, we first estimate a series of country-specific regressions and then average the 
                                                          
7 The parameter estimates associated with the cross-sectional averages have no meaningful 
interpretation on their own; thus, we do not report them in our regression tables. 
8 Without the inclusion of cross-sectional averages, the model represented in equation (4) is 
equivalent to the mean-group model of Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
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estimated coefficients across countries. The associated standard errors are derived non-
parametrically following Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
(iv) Baltagi et al. (2000) argue that the bias due to the incorrect assumption of parameter 
homogeneity needs to be weighed against the efficiency gains from pooling. They argue that 
allowing for parameter heterogeneity through a mean-group approach – even if warranted on 
theoretical grounds – may produce inferior results compared to a pooled approach. Therefore, we 
also estimate equation (4) in a pooled variant (with the short- and long-run coefficients being 
constrained to be equal across all countries) described in Pesaran (2006), with cross-sectional 
dependence still being controlled for by the inclusion of cross-sectional averages. To decide 
whether a heterogeneous or pooled variant is to be preferred, we follow Baltagi et al. (2000) and 
calculate the root mean square errors (RMSE) associated with each variant, consequently 
choosing the variant that minimizes the RMSE. 
5.2 Main Empirical Results 
The (dynamic) common correlated effects estimation results are reported in Table 4. Given that a 
mean-group (heterogeneous) modelling approach yields a smaller RMSE compared to a pooled 
(homogeneous) approach, we follow Baltagi et al. (2000) and prefer the mean-group over a 
pooled approach. Consequently, we will only report and discuss the mean-group findings.9 
—Table 4 here— 
First, let us consider the short-run effects, i.e., the impact of lags of the lagged differenced 
(dependent and independent) variables on the outcome. As expected, we find that lags of (first-
differenced) government size predict its present values. By contrast, there are no significant 
short-run effects of lags of population growth (i.e., first-differenced population size) on the 
growth of government. This implies that there are no instantaneous memoryless (short-run) 
                                                          
9 In Table 4 we only report (for the sake of brevity) one pooled-CCE regression result which we 
compare with an otherwise identically specified MG-CCE result, where the latter yields a smaller 
RMSE. However, we also compare all other (dynamic) MG-CCE models reported in Table 4 
with their pooled counterparts. The calculated RMSE always suggest that a heterogeneous 
modelling approach is preferred over the homogeneous (pooled) approach. 
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effects of population size on the government share (De Boef and Keele, 2008). Potentially, this 
lack of significance in short-run effects is due to the short-run relationship being highly 
heterogeneous, with dynamics on average cancelling each other out (cf. Eberhardt and 
Presbitero, 2015). 
However, long-run effects of population size on government size may still exist, implying effects 
with a memory that are distributed over time until equilibrium between population and 
government size is achieved (De Boef and Keele, 2008). Indeed, we are most interested in these 
long-run effects given the existence of a long-run (cointegrating) relationship (cf. Table 2). We 
calculate and report the long-run effect in two ways. First, we report the long-run coefficient 
associated with the lag of the level of population size, which corresponds to the average of 
coefficient πi
P from equation (4). Second, we report the average long-run coefficient of 
population size, which is equal to β= -πP/ πEC (using the average coefficients) from equation (3); 
for this estimate, the standard errors and associated t-statistics are calculated using the Delta 
method. 
Independent of the specification of the short-run dynamics, these long-run estimates strongly 
indicate that population size exerts (on average) a long-run positive effect on government size. 
This finding suggests that population factors that are costly and thus increase government size 
(e.g., congestion, conflict risk and costs of heterogeneity and social deviance) are more important 
than factors that negatively affect government size (scale economies, military deterrence and 
trade effects). 
Notably, this finding stands in stark contrast to our earlier findings from the “traditional” pooled 
OLS and fixed-effects approaches, where we found that population size decreases government 
size. Our findings also contrast with many earlier empirical contributions on the government 
size-population size nexus. For instance, our results are not in line with Alesina and Wacziarg 
(1998), who argue that scale economies lead to a negative association between population and 
government size. However, contrary to the “traditional” estimates reported in Table 3, the results 
reported in Table 4 are not affected by misspecification, suggesting that the latter are more 
trustworthy than the former. First, we are never able to reject the CD-test null hypothesis of 
cross-sectional independence. That is, by introducing (lags of) cross-sectional averages we are 
able to account for cross-sectional dependence, as argued by Pesaran (2006) and Chudik and 
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Pesaran (2015). Second, the regression residuals are always found to be stationary. In addition, 
the long-run estimates are dynamically stable and, given their negative sign and statistical 
significance, highly indicative of a cointegration relationship. 
Following De Boef and Keele (2008), the estimated positive long-run effect of population on 
government size implies that the eventual effect of the former on the latter is distributed over 
many time periods (i.e., years), where the estimated speed of adjustment πEC tells us how quickly 
equilibrium is achieved (i.e., how quickly the long-run effect is fully distributed). Using 
specification (2) of Table 4, we estimate a speed of adjustment (in absolute terms) of πEC=0.63 
and a long-run coefficient of population size of 2.127. This implies that 63% of the total effect of 
population size on government size materializes in the first year considered, 63% of the 
remaining effect materializes in the following year and so on.10 
In comparison to earlier studies that also find a positive effect of population size on the 
government share, our estimated effects are much larger. For instance, again using specification 
(2) of Table 4, our results imply that a one-percent increase in population size (the sample-mean 
population growth rate is two percent) results in a 2.1 percent increase in the (logged) 
government share, which are economically substantive effects. In comparison to, e.g., Ram 
(2009: 215), our estimated effects of population size on the government share are four to five 
times larger. 
5.3 Robustness 
Additional Covariates. As a robustness check, we amend equation (4) with additional controls 
for per capita income, the age dependency ratio (the ratio of those not in the labor force, i.e., 
children and the elderly, to those in the labor force, i.e., individuals aged between 15 and 65), 
democracy (a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 when a country conducts free and fair 
elections that may result in a peaceful turnover of legislative and executive offices), presidential 
system (a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 when a country has a presidential system), 
trade openness (the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP), the post-1990 period (a 
dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for the post-1990 period), population density and the 
                                                          
10 Using the formula 2.217*0.63t, we can see that the long-run effect of population size on the 
government share has been almost completely distributed after t=10 years. 
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urbanization rate. While the demographic and economic variables are drawn from the Penn 
World Tables (per capita income, trade openness) and World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2017) (age dependency ratio, population density, urbanization), the political variables are 
drawn from Bjornskov and Rode (forthcoming). All of these variables have been named as 
potential determinants of government size (e.g., Shelton, 2007; Kimakova, 2009). For instance, 
unfavorable demographic conditions (i.e., a large dependency ratio) may lead to larger 
government size due to increased public spending on education, health or old age care. 
As shown in Table 5, adding these variables to the model does not change our main finding of a 
positive (cointegrating) relationship between government and population size. This speaks to, 
inter alia, Lütkepohl (2007: 322) who argues that a cointegration relationship ought to be robust 
to model extensions. That is, a cointegrating relationship is expected to hold even when 
additional variables are added to the model. Consequently, a parsimonious model – which in our 
case only considers population size and government size and their short- and long-run dynamics 
– ought to be sufficient, particularly in the context of cointegration analysis (Lütkepohl, 2007). 
—Table 5 here— 
Alternative Versions of Penn World Table. Jetter and Parmeter (2015) show that different 
versions of the Penn World Table may yield different results concerning the effect of population 
size on the government share. Importantly, Jetter and Parmeter (2015: 58) note that empirical 
results “regarding the link between country size and government size are highly dependent on the 
dataset employed, the timeframe chosen, and the countries included.” 
To study how using different versions of the Penn World Table affects our results, we use a 
sample of 121 countries between 1970 and 2007; these countries appear in all four versions of 
the Penn World Table (6.3, 7.1, 8.1 and 9.0) that we consider below.11 Using such a uniform 
sample rules out that our findings are rather driven by differences in the timeframe or country 
sample chosen. 
                                                          




We report our findings in Table 6. First, regardless of which version of the Penn World Table we 
use, we find evidence in favor of a positive long-run relationship between population size and the 
government share. However, while using alternative versions of the Penn World Table does not 
overturn our main result, the estimated long-run effects differ markedly with respect to their size, 
which speaks to Jetter and Parmeter (2015) in that dataset choices may have analytical 
ramifications. Also consistent with Jetter and Parmeter (2015), later versions of the Penn World 
Table appear to produce more robust evidence in favor of a statistically meaningful relationship 
between the two variables of interest. 
—Table 6 here— 
5.4 Reverse Causation 
The cointegration results in Tables 2 (Panel C) and 4 imply that there exists a long-run 
relationship between population and government size. If two variables are cointegrated, one 
variable must Granger-cause the other or there must be Granger causality in both directions 
simultaneously (Engle and Granger, 1987). That is, while the panel cointegration test results 
show that population and government size are (Granger-causally) linked, they do not indicate the 
“direction” of Granger causality. So far, we have assumed – following the existing literature – 
that Granger causality runs from population size (as the independent variable) to government 
size (as the dependent variable). However, feedback between both variables may also exist. For 
instance, larger government size may correlate with higher public spending on health, education 
and welfare. Such increased public spending in turn may incentivize “quality” over “quantity” 
with respect to childbearing, thus reducing population growth at the macro-level. Conversely, 
increased welfare spending may also attract international migration, consequently fueling 
population growth. While the nature of the effect of government size on population size is thus a 
priori unclear, it is nevertheless necessary to test whether feedback exists, as such an effect 
would lead us to question the validity of our empirical findings. 
To investigate whether government size also impacts population size, we consider the following 
specification: 
∆POP𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0𝑖 + 𝜋𝑖
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑖
𝑃𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑖
𝑝Δ𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝜋𝑖
𝑔
Δ𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     
20 
 
                           +𝜋1𝑖
𝐶𝐴ΔPOP𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋2𝑖
𝐶𝐴POP𝑡−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜋3𝑖
𝐶𝐴ΔGOV𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜋4𝑖
𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                       
+ ∑ 𝜋5𝑖𝑙




𝐶𝐴ΔGOV𝑡−𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑝
𝑙=1
                                           (5)  
Equation (5) corresponds to equation (4), with the dependent and independent variable being 
inverted. As above, the inclusion of (lagged) cross-section averages accounts for cross-sectional 
dependence and allows for only weakly exogenous regressors in a dynamic setting (Chudik and 
Pesaran, 2015), while first-differencing and the inclusion of an ECM accounts for non-
stationarity and cointegration. 
We summarize our empirical findings from (5) in Table 7. Here, we only report the long-run 
estimates for an effect of government size on population size, given that the short-run estimates – 
as with the other direction of causality reported in Table 4 – tend to be uninformative.12 As 
shown in Table 7, regardless of which lag order of the short-run dynamics we choose, there is 
never a long-run effect running from government size to population size (Panel A). Here, the 
diagnostics indicate that the underlying models are specified correctly. By contrast, we 
previously found that population size always exerts a positive and statistically significant long-
run effect on government size. For comparison, these findings are also presented in a concise 
fashion in Table 7 (Panel B). In sum, the empirical results of Table 7 therefore indicate that 
while (i) cointegration between population and government size exists, (ii) Granger causality 
runs from population size to government size but (iii) not vice versa, so that (iv) the results 
reported in Table 4 are not affected by feedback and remain valid. 
—Table 7 here— 
5.5 Extension: Conditional and Non-Linear Effects 
                                                          
12 The short-run estimates are reported in Supplementary Table 2. In short, these results show 
that the various lags of the first-differences of government size (population size) almost never 
exert a statistically significant effect on population size (government size). By contrast, there is 
strong evidence of short-run autoregressive behavior, which – as expected – suggests that past 




While our dynamic mean-group approach allows for a maximum of country-specific 
heterogeneity, it may nevertheless be fruitful to also consider whether our main result – 
population size increases government size in the long run – is also relevant to sub-samples of 
countries that differ with respect to specific characteristics. Below, we differentiate between (i) 
(relatively) poor and rich economies and (ii) (relatively) small and large countries, allowing for 
conditional or non-linear effects of population size on government size. 
Economic Development. The nexus between population and government size may be different 
between rich and poor countries, i.e., conditional upon a country’s level of economic 
development. Here, it is a priori unclear whether the effect of population size on government size 
is more or less pronounced in richer economies. On the one hand, richer countries tend to be less 
affected by violent conflict (e.g., civil wars; see Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Thus, richer 
countries may have to devote fewer resources to anti-conflict measures as their populations 
grow, so that the effect of population size on government size may become weaker as the level of 
economic development increases. On the other hand, richer countries tend to be more open to 
international trade, e.g., as found in Ram (2009); in turn, increased exposure to trade may create 
demand for higher government spending to insure against the risks of trade (Rodrik, 1998). 
Finally, Wagner’s law postulates that richer countries are generally more prone to government 
expansion (e.g., Shelton, 2007), as richer countries are expected to fund public goods (e.g., the 
arts) for which scale effects may be less important. 
Non-Linear Effects. The influence of population on government size may differ with the total 
size of the population, suggesting a non-linear effect of the former on the latter. For instance, 
congestion costs (which are expected to increase with population size and stimulate government 
growth) may be negligible below a certain population threshold and therefore may only matter 
for fairly large countries (Alesina, 2003). Similarly, the costs of heterogeneity and increased 
conflict risk may only become pronounced above a certain population threshold. 
Empirical Results. We run a series of common correlated effects mean-group estimations as 
specified in equation (4) for various sub-samples. To create these sub-samples, we use the 
interquartile mean of population size and per capita income. Relying on the interquartile mean 
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provides protection against outliers; at the same time, it allows us to split the sample into two 
sub-samples of roughly equal size.13 
Our empirical results are reported in Table 8. First, we find that population size only increases 
government size in countries with a population of more than 10 million inhabitants. For countries 
with less than 10 million inhabitants, there is no significant (positive or negative) long-run effect 
of population size on government size. This may indicate that the detriments of population size 
(which consequently stimulate government growth) only materialize above a certain population 
threshold, so that population and government size are potentially non-linearly related. Second, 
we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size in relatively rich 
and poor countries. Thus, a country’s level of economic development does not seem to play an 
obvious role in moderating the population-government size nexus. 
—Table 8 here— 
6. Conclusion 
There are conflicting schools of thought regarding the effect of population size on government 
size. One school argues that more populous countries benefit from scale economies and reduced 
exposure to the risks of international conflict and trade and can thus afford smaller governments. 
Another school of thought argues that more populous countries necessitate larger governments to 
counter congestion, heterogeneity costs and the ill effects of a larger population size on social 
deviance and domestic conflict. 
Given these conflicting lines of argument, we examine the population-government size nexus for 
a panel of 130 countries for the 1970-2014 period. We find that “traditional” pooled OLS and 
fixed-effects approaches to this nexus are incorrectly specified, as they fail to properly account 
for cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration. Consequently, we employ a 
panel time-series approach that adequately addresses these issues. With this novel empirical 
approach, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size, 
                                                          
13 The interquartile mean (IQM) refers to the mean of the middle 50 percent (i.e., the second and 
third quartile) of the data, so that outliers (which would lie in the first and fourth quartile) are not 
considered when the IQM is calculated. 
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suggesting that the effects of population size that promote larger governments (more congestion, 
increased costs of heterogeneity, social deviance and conflict) dominate effects that reduce 
government size. As an extension to our empirical analysis, we show that this effect tends to be 
more important to countries with more than 10 million inhabitants, potentially suggesting a non-
linear relationship between population and government size. 
Populations in many developing countries (especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America) are 
expected to grow substantially in the coming decades. In light of our findings, as their 
populations increase, these countries cannot expect to see their government size shrink relative to 
GDP. Instead, the opposite may occur. Given the potential impact of government size on socio-
economic outcomes such as economic growth, private investment, life satisfaction and 
macroeconomic stability, policymakers would therefore do well to pay close attention to the role 
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Variable N*T Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Government Size  5,850 19.63 10.43 1.66 95.44 
Population Size 5,850 38.41 132.72 0.05 1,369.44 
ln(Government Size) 5,850 2.85 0.50 0.51 4.56 
ln(Population Size) 5,850 1.99 1.89 -2.95 7.22 
∆ ln(Government Size) 5,720 0.01 0.14 -1.39 1.63 
∆ ln(Population Size) 5,720 0.02 0.02 -0.20 0.18 
Per Capita GDP 5,850 11,876.92 18,380.51 142.39 245,077.9 
Age Dependency Ratio 5,850 72.86 19.84 16.33 120.76 
Democracy 5,850 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Presidential System 5,850 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Trade Openness 5,850 69.75 37.82 3.59 354.11 
Population Density 5,850 103.86 152.95 0.82 1,766.45 
Urbanization 5,850 49.73 24.15 2.85 99.16 
Note: ∆=First-difference operator. 





























Panel A: Test for Cross-Sectional Dependence 




(ln) Government Size 33.12 
(0.00)*** 
0.41 
(ln) Population Size 543.24 
(0.00)*** 
0.95 
Notes: Test robust to non-stationarity and parameter heterogeneity. ***p<0.01 (rejection 
of H0 of cross-sectional independence). 
Panel B: Panel Unit Root Tests 
Variable IPS-Statistic CADF-Statistic 
Level Data 
(ln) Government Size 0.39 -1.54 
(ln) Population Size 5.67 -1.74 
First-Differenced Data 
∆ (ln) Government Size -55.17*** -2.58*** 
∆ (ln) Population Size -5.81*** -2.28*** 
Notes: ∆=First-difference operator. All panel unit root tests include country-specific 
constants as deterministic components. IPS test: lag order chosen by Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and cross-sectional averages from the series subtracted to 
account for cross-sectional dependence. CADF test: lag order p=4 chosen according to 
rule of thumb p=int(T1/3). To eliminate the cross-sectional dependence, standard ADF 
regressions are augmented with the cross-section averages of lagged levels and first-
differences of the individual series. ***p<0.01 (rejection of H0 of non-stationarity). 
Panel C: Panel Cointegration Test 





Notes: Ha for V1 and V2: All panels are cointegrated. Ha for V3 and V4: Some panels 
are cointegrated. V2 and V4 include secular time trend. All test variants include panel 
means as deterministic components and subtract cross-sectional averages from to 
account for cross-sectional dependence ***p<0.01 (rejection of H0 of no cointegration). 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Econometric Method → POLS POLS FE FE POLS FE 
ln(Population Size) -0.058 -0.056 -0.253 -0.404   
 (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.077)*** (0.117)***   
Δ ln(Population Size)     -0.267 -0.222 
     (0.175) (0.242) 
Year-Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 5,850 5,850 5,850 5,850 5,720 5,720 
Root MSE 0.488 0.484 0.336 0.329 0.137 0.136 
CADF-statistic -1.43 -1.27 -1.27 -1.25 -2.52 2.63 
(p-value) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
CD-statistic 32.16 -0.10 40.43 -2.62 2.01 2.00 
(p-value) (0.00)*** (0.92) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.04)** (0.04)** 
Notes: Dependent variable=ln(Government Size) in models (1) to (4) and Δ ln(Government Size) in models 
(5) and (6) Constant not reported. POLS=Pooled OLS estimation. FE=Fixed-effects estimation. Δ=First-
difference operator. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses for models (1) to (4). Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors in parentheses for models (5) and (6). *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. 






























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Method →  Pooled CCE MG-CCE MG-CCE MG-CCE MG-CCE 
Short-Run Estimates 
∆ ln(Population Size) 1.042 14.198 3.150 17.031 9.321 
 (5.671) (8.190)* (31.731) (31.598) (13.004) 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-1 -1.379 -10.051 7.205 31.996 -11.917 
 (5.671) (7.074) (45.968) (56.296) (30.734) 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-2   -13.330 31.523 12.907 
   (26.024) (51.757) (31.576) 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-3    -20.339 -8.279 
    (22.393) (13.433) 
∆ ln(Government Size) t-1 -0.032 0.172 0.207 0.338 0.159 
 (0.087) (0.021)*** (0.029)*** (0.044)*** (0.028)*** 
∆ ln(Government Size) t-2   0.075 0.169 0.076 
   (0.023)*** (0.035)*** (0.021)*** 
∆ ln(Government Size) t-3    0.132 0.043 
    (0.024)*** (0.015)*** 
Long-Run Estimates 
ln(Population Size) t-1 -0.308 2.127 2.910 3.404 1.414 
 (0.147) (0.765)*** (1.017)*** (1.245)*** (0.718)** 
ln(Government Size) t-1 -0.311 -0.630 -0.770 -0.979 -0.666 
 (0.147)** (0.032)*** (0.043)*** (0.061)*** (0.042)*** 
Long-Run Average Coefficient 
ln(Population Size)  3.376 3.778 3.475 2.213 
  (1.208)*** (1.337)*** (1.274)*** (1.076)** 
Number of Lags of 
Cross-Sectional 
Averages 
3 3 3 3 3 
Number of Observations 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 
Root MSE 0.144 0.088 0.082 0.074 0.086 
CADF-statistic -3.06 -3.46 -3.30 -3.33 -3.21 
(p-value) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
CD-statistic 0.39 1.33 0.49 -0.05 1.20 
(p-value) (0.69) (0.19) (0.63) (0.96) (0.23) 
Notes: Dependent variable=∆ ln(Government Size). Constant not reported. MG=Mean-
group. CCE=Common correlated effects. Model (5) allows for heterogeneous lag order; i.e., 
for each panel member and each variable, the largest lag in first-differences is dropped from 
the regressions if it is insignificant (at the 10%-level). Standard errors (constructed 
following Pesaran and Smith, 1995) in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Long-Run Estimates 
ln(Population Size) t-1 3.121 3.458 3.071 2.652 2.092 2.950 3.859 3.290 
 (0.993)*** (1.376)** (1.050)*** (1.029)** (0.951)** (1.013)*** (2.186)* (1.580)** 
ln(GDP per capita) t-1 -0.181        
 (0.049)***        
ln(Age Dependency Ratio) t-1  0.955       
  (0.700)       
Democracy t-1   0.007      
   (0.013)      
Presidential System t-1    -0.012     
    (0.012)     
ln(Trade Openness) t-1     -0.024    
     (0.028)    
Post 1990      -0.004   
      (0.018)   
Population Density t-1       -0.560  
       (0.333)*  
ln(Urbanization) t-1        1.068 
        (2.246) 
ln(Government Size) t-1 -0.829 -0.920 -0.790 -0.777 -0.788 -0.799 -0.947 -0.934 
 (0.042)*** (0.047)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.045)*** (0.045)*** (0.048)*** (0.049)*** 
Long-Run Average Coefficient 
ln(Population Size) 3.764 3.759 3.888 3.411 2.655 3.692 4.063 3.521 
 (1.208)*** (1.500)** (1.353)*** (1.340)** (1.220)** (1.288)*** (2.257)* (1.720)** 
Root MSE 0.077 0.077 0.080 0.081 0.078 0.080 0.076 0.077 
CADF-statistic -3.40 -3.64 -3.48 -3.34 -3.54 -3.52 -3.49 -3.44 
(p-value) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
CD-statistic 0.85 0.47 0.09 0.38 0.63 0.37 0.20 0.17 
(p-value) (0.40) (0.64) (0.37) (0.70) (0.53) (0.71) (0.84) (0.87) 
Notes: Dependent variable=∆ ln(Government Size). Short-run estimates not reported (lag order l=2). Number of observations is always 
5,330. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Otherwise, see Table 4. 
Table 5: Common Correlated Effects Error-Correction Estimates with Additional Covariates 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Version of Penn World Table → PWT 9.0 PWT 8.1 PWT 7.1 PWT 6.3 
Short-Run Lag Order → 3 3 4 6 
Long-Run Estimates 
ln(Population Size) t-1 3.400 2.766 2.800 4.198 
 (1.308)*** (1.289)** (1.681)* (2.326)* 
ln(Government Size) t-1 -0.838 -0.843 -1.054 -0.903 
 (0.060)*** (0.053)*** (0.079)*** (0.101)*** 
Long-Run Average Coefficient 
ln(Population Size) 4.059 3.280 2.657 4.649 
 (1.577)*** (1.561)** (1.560)* (2.551)* 
Number of Lags of Cross-
Sectional Averages 
3 3 4 3 
Number of Observations 4,148 4,148 4,026 4,090 
Root MSE 0.082 0.077 0.072 0.081 
CADF-statistic -3.27 -3.20 -3.36 -16.02 
(p-value) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
CD-statistic 0.39 -0.97 0.79 0.47 
(p-value) (0.70) (0.33) (0.43) (0.64) 
Notes: Dependent variable=∆ ln(Government Size). Constant not reported. MG=Mean-
group. All models allow for heterogeneous lag order; i.e., for each panel member and 
each variable, the largest lag in first-differences is dropped from the regressions if it is 
insignificant (at the 10%-level). Standard errors (constructed following Pesaran and 
Smith, 1995) in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. 







Panel A: Government Size ⇏ Population Size (Long-Run Effect) 






1 0.001 0.012 -4.05 1.25 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.00)*** (0.21) 
2 0.001 0.008 -4.08 -1.67 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.00)*** (0.11) 
3 -0.001 -0.003 -3.51 1.32 
 (0.001) (0.025) (0.00)*** (0.19) 
Panel B: Population Size ⇏ Government Size (Long-Run Effect) 






1 2.127 3.376 -3.46 1.33 
 (0.765)*** (1.208)*** (0.00)*** (0.19) 
2 2.910 3.778 -3.30 0.49 
 (1.017)*** (1.337)*** (0.00)*** (0.63) 
3 3.404 3.475 -3.33 -0.05 
 (1.245)*** (1.274)*** (0.00)*** (0.96) 
Notes: Lag order=Number of lags of dependent and independent variable in short-run part of 
respective model. Short-run results not reported. POP=Population size. GOV=Government size. 
LR=Long-run. Standard errors (constructed following Pesaran and Smith, 1995) in parentheses. 
*p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. 


























 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short-Run Estimates 
∆ ln(Population Size) 17.229 1.938 -40.502 58.449 
 (10.715) (22.924) (54.674) (34.177)* 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-1 -34.617 8.780 62.836 -100.961 
 (29.002) (52.586) (79.675) (80.549) 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-2 41.181 -12.873 -36.459 82.531 
 (25.108) (51.244) (56.370) (83.464) 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-3 -23.085 5.222 -10.515 -32.220 
 (18.555) (19.306) (21.442) (37.325) 
∆ ln(Government Size) t-1 0.167 0.152 0.267 0.369 
 (0.039)*** (0.039)*** (0.063)*** (0.061)*** 
∆ ln(Government Size) t-2 0.085 0.067 0.152 0.170 
 (0.031)*** (0.027)** (0.053)*** (0.042)*** 
∆ ln(Government Size) t-3 0.053 0.035 0.114 0.135 
 (0.021)** (0.021)* (0.038)*** (0.028)*** 
Long-Run Estimates 
ln(Population Size) t-1 2.245 0.658 3.527 2.515 
 (0.970)** (1.047) (1.957)* (1.215)** 
ln(Government Size) t-1 -0.601 -0.726 -0.914 -0.971 
 (0.059)*** (0.059)*** (0.080)*** (0.089)*** 
Long-Run Average Coefficient 
ln(Population Size) 3.735 0.906 3.856 2.590 
 (1.559)** (1.448) (2.140)* (1.241)** 
Number of Lags of Cross-
Sectional Averages 
3 3 2 3 








Number of Countries 62 68 64 66 
Number of Observations 2,542 2,788 2,624 2,706 
Root MSE 0.085 0.086 0.057 0.092 
CADF-statistic -3.56 -3.47 -3.50 -3.51 
(p-value) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
CD-statistic 1.47 -0.92 0.95 0.34 
(p-value) (0.14) (0.36) (0.34) (0.74) 
Notes: Dependent variable=∆ ln(Government Size). POP=Population Size. 
GDP=GDP per capita. Dynamic MG-CCE estimates reported. Constant not 
reported. Standard errors (constructed following Pesaran and Smith, 1995) in 
parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. 




Appendix. List of Countries 
 
Albania Côte d'Ivoire Jamaica Republic of Korea 
Algeria* Cyprus Japan Romania 
Angola D.R. of the Congo Jordan Rwanda 
Antigua and Barbuda Denmark Kenya Saint Lucia 
Argentina Djibouti Laos Sao Tome and Principe 
Australia Dominican Republic Lebanon Saudi Arabia 
Austria Ecuador Lesotho Senegal 
Bahamas Egypt Liberia Seychelles 
Bahrain* El Salvador* Madagascar Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh Equatorial Guinea Malawi South Africa 
Barbados Ethiopia Malaysia Spain 
Belgium Fiji Mali Sri Lanka 
Belize Finland Mauritania St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Benin France Mauritius Sudan 
Bhutan Gabon Mexico Suriname 
Bolivia Gambia Mongolia Swaziland 
Botswana Germany Morocco Sweden 
Brazil Ghana Mozambique Switzerland 
Brunei Greece Myanmar* Syria 
Bulgaria Grenada* Nepal Tanzania 
Burkina Faso Guatemala Netherlands Thailand 
Burundi Guinea New Zealand Togo 
Cabo Verde* Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Trinidad and Tobago 
Cambodia Haiti* Niger Tunisia 
Cameroon Honduras Nigeria Turkey 
Canada Hungary Norway Uganda 
Central African Republic Iceland Oman United Arab Emirates* 
Chad India Pakistan United Kingdom 
Chile Indonesia Paraguay United States 
China Iran Peru Uruguay 
Colombia Iraq Philippines Venezuela 
Comoros Ireland Poland Viet Nam 
Congo Israel Portugal Zambia 
Costa Rica Italy Qatar* Zimbabwe 




















Notes: All data series are time-demeaned to account for 
cross-sectional dependence. **p<0.05 (rejection of H0 of 
no cointegration). For additional information on these 
tests, see Pedroni (1997, 1999). 




































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable →  ∆ ln(Population Size) ∆ ln(Government Size) 
Short-Run Estimates 
∆ ln(Population Size)    14.198 3.150 17.031 
    (8.190)* (31.731) (31.598) 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-1 0.862 0.788 1.623 -10.051 7.205 31.996 
 (0.018)*** (0.063)*** (0.048)*** (7.074) (45.968) (56.296) 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-2  -0.311 -1.124  -13.330 31.523 
  (0.043)*** (0.064)***  (26.024) (51.757) 
∆ ln(Population Size) t-3   0.236   -20.339 
   (0.047)***   (22.393) 
∆ ln(Government Size) 0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
∆ ln(Government Size) t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.172 0.207 0.338 
 (0.001) (0.000)** (0.001) (0.021)*** (0.029)*** (0.044)*** 
∆ ln(Government Size) t-2  -0.001 -0.001  0.075 0.169 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.023)*** (0.035)*** 
∆ ln(Government Size) t-3   -0.001   0.132 
   (0.001)   (0.024)*** 
Long-Run Estimates 
ln(Population Size) t-1 -0.067 -0.138 -0.038 2.127 2.910 3.404 
 (0.006)*** (0.028)*** (0.009)*** (0.765)*** (1.017)*** (1.245)*** 
ln(Government Size) t-1 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.630 -0.770 -0.979 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.032)*** (0.043)*** (0.061)*** 
Long-Run Average Coefficient 
ln(Government Size) 0.012 0.008 -0.003    
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.025)    
ln(Population Size)    3.376 3.778 3.475 
    (1.208)*** (1.337)*** (1.274)*** 
Number of Lags of Cross-
Sectional Averages 
4 10 8 3 3 3 
Number of Observations 5,200 4,420 4,680 5,330 5,330 5,330 
Root MSE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.088 0.082 0.074 
CADF-statistic -4.05 -4.08 -3.513 -3.46 -3.30 -3.33 
(p-value) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
CD-statistic 1.25 -1.67 1.32 1.33 0.49 -0.05 
(p-value) (0.21) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19) (0.63) (0.96) 
Notes: Mean-group common correlated effects results reported. Constant not reported. Standard errors 
(constructed following Pesaran and Smith, 1995) in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. 
Supplementary Table 2: Short- and Long-Run Estimates of Weak Exogeneity Tests 
